Political connections are not a single treatment. Board seats, party membership, and legislative appointments can pull firms in different directions — access to credit and contracts on one side, scrutiny and soft-budget constraints on the other. When do connections help, when do they hurt, and through which channel?
Chinese listed firms matched to director-level political ties (party committees, NPC/CPPCC appointments, and related institutional seats), with firm-year performance and financing outcomes.
Typology of connection sub-types at the board and ownership level; estimates rely on staggered appointment timing and within-firm variation across connection channels.
Working paper. Draft available on request while the PDF is prepared for hosting.
]]>Why do some private entrepreneurs enter the NPC, CPPCC, or party-linked business associations while others remain outside? Selection is rarely random — firm size, sector, and prior political exposure all shape the pathway.
Roster data on entrepreneurs in regime-linked institutions, combined with interviews on participation pathways. Field notes from Beijing (April 2026) inform the current draft’s description of director-level entry routes.
Maps the institutional “salon” channels that absorb entrepreneurs into the regime, documenting selection criteria and the sequence of entry rather than treating membership as a binary treatment.
Working paper. Draft available on request while the PDF is prepared for hosting.
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